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CREATION, REDEMPTION AND VIRTUE 
Caleb Miller 
In this paper, I defend the claim that Christian theology gives us good reason 
to think that virhle is relati\'e to individuals and communities, i.e., that what 
character traits are virtues for individuals is relative to individuals and to the 
communities of which they are members. I begin by reviewing the theological 
claims that I take to be relevant. I then argue that these claims make it plausi-
ble to conclude that virtue is morally redemptive and therefore relative to indi-
viduals and communities. I then seek to use these conclusions to illuminate 
the discussion of the correctiveness of virtue. Finally I respond to some objec-
tions and suggest some further ways that my views could be developed. 
I. Theological Background 
God, according to Christian theology, created humanity. Moreover, he cre-
ated humanity in order for human beings to fulfill the purposes for which 
he created humanity. Taken together, I am assuming, these purposes con-
stihlte the human telos, the fulfillment of which would constitute achieve-
ment of the human good. The primary purpose for which human beings 
were created is to love God. Part of what it is for human beings to love 
God is for them to love each other. The good human being, i.e., the person 
whose life fulfilled her telos, would have a character that disposed her to 
live only in ways consistent with the love of God and the love of other 
human beings. 
Human sin, however, has seriously undermined the achievement of 
those purposes. It has done so in two ways. It has directly undermined 
the achievement of our telos in that human sin is constituted by a refusal to 
cooperate with God's purposes for humanity. Secondly, it has under-
mined the fulfillment of our purpose by so corrupting human nature that 
we have become incapable of achieving God's purposes for us. That is, 
human character has become so deficient that human beings, in the grip of 
sin, are incapable of living a life characterized by the love of God and the 
love of others. Redemption is God's effort to save humanity from sin. This 
effort is most centrally, I suggest, an effort to restore human life to the love 
of God and others. Redemption includes, of course, the offer of forgive-
ness in Christ and the gift of eternal life. But it also includes God's effort to 
transform human beings into people who love God and love their fellow 
human beings, i.e., to become people who fulfill the human telos. 
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II. The Redemptiveness of Virtue 
Morality, I suggest, is intended by God to increase the degree to which we 
fulfill the purpose for which God created us, or, alternatively, the degree to 
which we fulfill our telos. Following Aristotle, I suggest that virtue is "the 
state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his 
own work well." (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106') Virtue is then the state of 
character that improves the degree to which our lives approximate the life 
for which God created humanity.l Virtues are character traits which 
improve our conformity to our telos. This much I take to be fairly typical of 
those who have sought to think about virtue from a Christian perspective. 
Indeed, except for the theistic interpretation of the human telos, it is consis-
tent with Aristotle's account of virtue. What is missing from such a gener-
ic understanding of the relationship of human nature to virtue is an appre-
ciation of human fallenness. More specifically, such an understanding typ-
ically overlooks the fact that the character of fallen human beings is 
deformed by sin and that the deformity of human character leaves human 
beings morally incapacitated. As such, human character is not only in 
need of maturity and perfection, it is in need of restoration, particularly the 
restoration of moral capacities. Given human depravity, human fulfillment 
is human redemption. I suggest, therefore, that morality is intended by 
God to redeem humanity, i.e., to restore humanity to the life for which he 
created us and from which we are fallen by sin. In particular, I suggest 
that virtues are those character traits which contribute to our redemption. 
More precisely they are those character traits that are best suited to over-
coming the impediments of sin to the fulfillment of our telos.2 In what fol-
lows, I shall develop the implications of this suggestion and defend it 
along the way. 
III. Redemption and the Relativity of Virtue 
Martha Nussbaum has pointed out an interesting difference between the 
virtue ethics of Aristotle and that of his twentieth century admirers. Unlike 
Aristotle, twentieth century defenders of virtue ethics" as otherwise diverse 
as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams and Philippa Foot" are relativists 
when it comes to virtue.3 According to Nussbaum, Aristotle accepted and 
these relativists deny the correctness "of a single objective account of the 
human good, or human flourishing,"4 and the correctness of a single "list of 
virtues that will serve as normative for all ... societies.u5 Nussbaum seems 
to assume that these two differences between Aristotle and relativist virtue 
theorists are inextricably linked to each other, i.e., that relativism with 
respect to the human good requires relativism with respect to virtue, and 
vice versa, and similarly that absolutism with respect to one of these issues 
requires absolutism with respect to the other. Indeed, she seems to treat 
these two differences as alternative characterizations of the same difference. 
She therefore defends the existence of a single objectively correct account of 
the human good, by arguing that there is a single objectively correct list of 
human virtues. But it is not at all obvious that these two different claims are 
as inextricably connected as Nussbaum takes them to be. Indeed, I shall 
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argue, an appreciation of the fact that virtue is redemptive gives us reason 
to accept relativism, in Nussbaum's sense, with respect to virtue, and to 
reject relativism with respect to the human good or telos. 
Let us assume what I have already claimed, viz., that the human good 
consists in fulfilling the purposes for which God created us, and the actions 
and character traits that fulfill those purposes are respectively those that 
express, and dispose us to, the love of God and others. For the sake of argu-
ment, assume that excellence of character comes in degrees ranging from 
zero to ten. A person with a character rating of ten would be precisely dis-
posed to live perfectly in accordance with her telos, whereas a person with a 
character rating of zero would be disposed to live life entirely in opposition 
to her telos. One way to think about virtue is to hold that virtues are all and 
only those character traits that the person with a character rating of ten 
would have. After all, what character traits would be better suited to satis-
fying Aristotle's requirement that virtues make a person good and make 
him do his own work well? But that way of thinking about what makes us 
good considers only our telos. It fails to take into account our fallenness. 
The traits that are best suited to improving the character and actions of a 
person with a character rating of four might be quite different from those 
that would guide the actions of a person whose character were perfect. 
In order to defend that claim, I need to spell out some assumptions I am 
making about human moral psychology. Although I shall not defend these 
assumptions, I intend them to be plausible, independently of the use I make 
of them. A character trait, I am assuming, is a disposition to act in some 
particular way. Dispositions to act are dispositions to intentional behavior. 
These dispositions are constituted by such factors as beliefs, desires, com-
mitments and psychological tendencies. A person's character is the set of 
all such dispositions of that person. The character of a community is the set 
of all such dispositions in the members of that community. I am assuming 
that character traits are acquired and sustained, in large part, by habituation 
and by social influence. In other words, acting in some particular way rein-
forces the disposition to act in that way. Other things being equal, the more 
frequently one acts in that way, the more strongly such actions reinforce the 
corresponding dispositions. The dispositions of an individual are also 
strongly influenced by the actions, character and commitments of the other 
members of the communities to which that person belongs. Much more 
could fruitfully be said about how character and action causally relate to 
each other, but these general comments will be enough for me to defend the 
claim that virtue is relative to communities and individuals. 
Let me illustrate by considering one of the teachings of Jesus. In the 
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus said, "You have heard that it was said, 'Eye 
for eye, and tooth for tooth.' but I tell you, Do not resist an evil person."" 
and later "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, ... //7 
It is interesting that the precept with which Jesus contrasts his teaching is 
quoted directly from the Old Testament, which Jesus manifestly took to be 
the Word of God. Arthur Holmes offers a fairly standard explanation for 
the existence of this requirement of the Old Testament Law. "In the 
ancient near East, ... vastly disproportionate punishments were often the 
practice. The Old Testament Law insists on a proportionate response to evil 
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and limits society's use of force."s Against that background, proportionate 
retribution was closer to the ideal of love for one's fellow human beings. 
In that context, the effect of the "eye for eye" rule was to limit the degree to 
which actions were opposed to the love of others. But, in the spirit of 
encouraging the love of others, Jesus asks his followers to go beyond limit-
ing one's retaliation. He asks them rather to do just what the love of others 
would require, i.e., to seek what is good for others, regardless of the harm 
that they have done to the agent. 
Why, then, would God prescribe" an eye for an eye," for the members of 
an ancient near Eastern culture? The practice of "an eye for an eye" would 
improve the degree to which the lives of those who would have otherwise 
been inclined to disproportional retaliation are conformed to the human 
telos. It would also improve, by habituation, the character of those who 
would otherwise be disposed to disproportionate retaliation by replacing 
that disposition with one more closely approximating the disposition to 
treat others according to love. The more rigorous requirement of uncondi-
tionallove, to which Jesus called his followers, would improve, in these two 
ways, the conformity to the love of God and others of those otherwise dis-
posed to proportionate retribution. But we are still left with a question, Why 
would it not have been better for God to have instructed his ancient Near 
Eastern people to follow the ideal standard of unconditional love? A plau-
sible answer to that question is, I think, that the practices that would have 
been required to cultivate and sustain the character trait of unconditional 
love were not, given the character of ancient Israel, practices to which they 
could constructively aspire.9 They were not, in other words, practices to 
which they could aspire in a way that would tend to improve their confor-
mity to the love of others. That was true, I suspect, either because their 
character left them incapable of genuinely aspiring to practices so strongly 
opposed to their dispositions, or because their character left them incapable 
of improving by such aspiration the degree to which they achieved that 
standard. If they had regarded unconditional love as a standard to which 
they were subject when it was utterly beyond their moral capacities to meet 
it, it would only have discouraged them from the project of improving their 
lives morally, and habituated them to the violation of their moral standards. 
If all that is true, then the disposition (let us call it "reciprocity") to treat oth-
ers as one has been treated by them, was redemptive for the citizens of 
ancient Israel. It was a character trait that tended to transform their lives 
and their character in the direction of the love of God and others. Because it 
was redemptive for them, it was a virtue for them, i.e., it tended to make 
them good and to make them to do their own work well. 
However, the character of the followers of Jesus is, or should be, such 
that they can constructively aspire to the standard of unconditionallove.lO 
For us, unconditional love is a virtue and reciprocity is a vice, a disposition 
to treat others in ways that violate unconditional love for them. It is even 
conceivable that the character of a community is such that a disposition (let 
us call it "vindictiveness") to retaliate disproportionately against wrong-
doers would serve to improve the life and character of its members by rein-
forcing an otherwise deficient repugnance for, and avoidance of, wrong 
actions. It is conceivable then that vindictiveness would have therefore 
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been a virtue for the members of such a community despite the fact that it 
was a vice for the ancient Israelites and for Christian believers. 
Whatever the plausibility of these particular claims about these particu-
lar communities and conceivable communities, I hope I have at least illus-
trated how what is virtuous for a person can depend on what is redemp-
tive for that person, and that what is redemptive for her can depend on the 
particular degree and type of corruption from which her character, and 
that of her community, suffers. 
The illustration that I have offered is one in which the relevant character 
differences existed between communities separated by time. But there is 
nothing essentially temporal about such differences. This is not the place 
to pursue it, but the anthropological evidence suggests that there are differ-
ences among contemporary communities in the degree and type of corrup-
tion from which the character of those communities suffers. It seems obvi-
ous to me that at least some of these differences affect what character traits 
are redemptive for the members of the communities which so differ. Some 
cultures, for whatever reason, are quite prone to addictive behavior. 
Others seem to be relatively impervious to it. It seems to me that a severe 
ascetic disposition would likely be redemptive for the members of the first 
type of society whereas it might inhibit the appropriate appreciation of 
God's good gifts in the second society. A vigilant wariness of relating with 
members of the opposite sex would probably be redemptive in a society 
utterly lacking in sexual restraint, whereas the same trait would likely limit 
the degree to which people were able to love their neighbors in a society in 
which chastity is successfully sustained by strong social influences and the 
habituation that results from such influences. In each of these cases it 
seems plausible to me to that there is a character trait that would be a 
virtue in one of the societies that would be a vice in the other. 
Not all of the relevant differences in character are differences among 
communities. Differences within a society in the specific degree and type 
of individual corruption affect what traits are virtues for the members of 
that society. The sort of affectionate disposition toward children that 
would morally improve the ability of most people to love children would 
likely be a vice for a pedophile, since, combined with the other features of 
his character, it would likely dispose him to the abuse of children. 
Similarly, a billionaire who could not constructively aspire to the sort of 
self-sacrificing love that Mother Teresa exhibited, would benefit from a rel-
atively generous, but less sacrificial, disposition that would have been a 
vice for Mother Teresa because it would have tended to make her life less 
conformed to the love of God and others. 
So, I suggest, while Christians have reasons to insist, with Nussbaum 
and Aristotle, on the correctness "of a single objective account of the 
human good, or human flourishing," they have reason to deny, with the 
relativist opponents of Aristotle and Nussbaum, the correctness of a single 
"list of virtues that will serve as normative for all ... societies." 
Nussbaum's failure to recognize the possibility of such a position came, I 
suggest, from the failure to recognize that the character traits of the good 
human being can be different from the character traits that make a human 
being good. That failure amounts to the failure to recognize that human 
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character is, in various ways, so defective that the dispositions of the 
morally ideal human being are beyond our capacities. Virtue is always, for 
fallen human beings, redemptive in the sense that its making one good is a 
matter of repairing the damage of sin to our character, or of counteracting 
the effects of such damage on our actions. 
TV. Redemptiveness and the Corrective Nature of Virtue 
The recognition of the inevitably redemptive nature of virtue for fallen 
humanity explains what is right about the claim of Philippa Foot and oth-
ers that the virtues are "corrective." According to Foot, "[I]t is only 
because fear and the desire for pleasure operate as temptations that 
courage and temperance exist as virtues at all." Later she adds, "[T]here is, 
for instance, a virtue of industriousness only because idleness is a tempta-
tion; and of humility only because men tend to think too well of them-
selves. Hope is a virtue [only] because despair too is a temptation."ll 
Robert C. Roberts points out that these counterfactual claims are, in some 
cases, false. He distinguishes between "virtues of will power," such as 
courage, self-control and patience, and "substantive" or "motivational" 
virtues, such as honesty, justice, generosity and gratitude. The latter virtues 
are substantive because they are the "psychological embodiment of moral 
rules-the substance of the ethical patterns of behavior and judgment and 
emotion."!2 They are motivational in that they are a matter of having the 
right set of motives, wanting the right things, taking satisfaction in the right 
things, etc. Virtues of will power, on the other hand, do "not imply any 
characteristically ethical patterns of behavior, judgment, and emotion. 
Racists, cheats, sadists, and thieves may well be persevering, resolute, and 
self-controlled ... "13 Foot's claims about the corrective nature of virtue 
apply, according to Roberts, only to the virhles of will power: 
If people were never led astray by fears and pleasures, it is plausible 
that courage and self-control themselves would not arise. For courage 
and self-control are the capacities to manage our inclinations, when 
they are wayward, to flee dangers and seek pleasures ... [But] 
Industriousness could exist in a world in which no one suffered from 
laziness, and honesty in a world where no one lied-though it is likely 
that in such a world these virtues would not be named or much 
noticed. The substantive virtues are' corrective' in the trivial sense that 
there are vices which correspond to them; the virtues of will power are 
corrective in the significant sense that, in our present psychological 
condition but not in every imaginable one, they are needed to keep us 
on the path of virtue and our higher self-interest.!4 
While Roberts is right that some virtues would exist even if no one were 
tempted by the corresponding vice, appreciating the redemptiveness of 
virtue enables us to see that all of the virtues are corrective in a sense deeper 
than their mere opposition to vices. For fallen human beings, no character 
trait is a virtue, tmless it is well suited to overcoming dispositions opposed to 
the love of God and others, and the moral incapacities of our character. 
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There are, moreover, not onJy virtues of will power, but also substantive 
virhles, such as reciprocity, that are needed given a particular psychological 
condition, but not given every imaginable one to keep people /I on the path of 
virtue and [their] higher self-interest./I The issue of whether a trait would 
serve that purpose in a human being without vice, is quite distinct from the 
issue of whether, given our actual condition, it is needed to correct our incli-
nation". The issue of whether a character trait can be put to immoral uses is 
also distinct from the issue of whether it would be a trait of the human being 
without vice. Although industriousness and loyalty would be virtues even 
for those lacking the contrary inclinations, they too can enhance the work of 
racists, cheats, sadists, and thieves. But that does not mean that they are 
virtues which do "not imply any characteristically ethical patterns of behav-
ior, judgment, or emotion." Courage, self-control, industriousness, and loy-
alty are virtues, and they can be exercised in the pursuit of theft. But, in the 
thief, they are not virtues. The dispositions to pursue theft courageously 
industriously, with self-control, etc., do not tend to improve the conformity 
of the thief to the love of God and others. This is I think what is correct about 
Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of the virtues. Character traits are not virtues 
independently of their relations to the rest of one's character. The issue is not 
however, as Aristotle thought, whether all of one's character traits are those 
of a good person, i.e., the person in whom the human telos is fulfilled. 
Whether a given character trait of a person is a virtue or not, depends rather 
on whether combining it with her other character traits is a redemptive com-
bination, i.e., whether it tends to improve her conformity to her telos. 
The equivalence Robert" assumes between substantive virilles and those 
one would have even if we had no contrary inclinations comes from a failure 
to recognize that the substance of morality is itself affected by the limitations 
of our psychological condition due to sin. What we ought to do, morally, 
depends in part on what the limitations of our character are. His failure to 
recognize that the character traits of the morally perfect person, such as 
industriousness, could be vicious in those with character deficiencies is due 
to his overlooking the effects of sin on the sort of life that would tend to 
make us good. His failure to recognize the possibility that there could be 
character traits, such as reciprocity, that are substantive virtues onJy because 
of their corrective function is likewise due to a failure to appreciate the 
redemptive nature of virille for fallen human beings. None of this under-
mines the claim that there is an important distinction between substantive or 
motivational virilles and virtues of will power. But the degree to which, and 
the sense in which, they are corrective are not differences between them. 
v. Two Objections 
It might be objected that the example of the courageous thief is really best 
thought of as a counter-example to my claim that virtue is a matter of 
redemptiveness in the sense T intend. Although courage does, given a 
thief's disposition to steal, tend to diminish the degree to which his life 
conforms to the love of God and others, it might nevertheless be thought to 
be a virtue. After all, vices are generally thought of as character traits of 
which one ought to seek to rid oneself. But it seems that if we were to give 
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the thief moral advice, we should advise him to seek to overcome his dis-
position to steal but not advise him to become cowardly. That would seem 
to indicate that his disposition to steal is a vice but his courage is not.15 
My contention is that both the courage of the thief and his disposition to 
steal are vices. These two traits form an unredemptive combination. But it 
does not follow that all ways of eliminating it are equally good. There are 
typically two possible ways of eliminating this unredemptive combination 
in the thief's character: 1) eliminating his disposition to steal, or 2) eliminat-
ing his courage. Of these two, 1) is obviously a morally better strategy. To 
be a courageous, honest person is obviously better conformed to the human 
te/os than to be a cowardly thief. That a courageous thief is morally worse 
than he would be if he were cowardly is typically irrelevant to the question 
of how he ought to seek moral improvement. If for some reason, it were 
possible for the thief to cultivate cowardice, but not possible to undermine 
his disposition to steal/6 then he would be morally well advised to under-
take such a course of action. Such advice would be similar to the sentiment 
expressed by Jesus when he said, "If your hand causes you to sin, cut it off. 
It is better for you to enter life maimed than with two hands to go into hell, 
where the fire never goes OUt."F This is usually taken as a bit of hyperbole 
on Jesus' part. The literal advice to amputate one's hand when it con-
tributes to sin is hyperbolic. But the literal truth behind the hyperbole is 
that one is morally better off without one's hand if its absence can eliminate 
the means to sin. There are, of course, typically less drastic means of seek-
ing to avoid sin. But if, for some reason, the amputation of a person's hand 
really were the only means of eliminating some besetting sin,]8 then she 
would be morally well-advised to seek the amputation. Hands can be very 
good things if they are put to good use, but if they were unavoidably put 
only or mostly to sinful use, we would be morally better off without them. 
Similarly, courage can be a very good character trait if it is put to good use, 
but if it were unavoidably used by a person only or mostly to steal effectively, 
then he would be morally well advised to seek its elimination. 
A second objection to the relativity of virtue of the sort for which I have 
been arguing is that the "relative virtues" are really not virtues, but merely 
traits that are prudentially useful for moral development.]9 Although the 
traits in question are typically desirable in part because of their usefulness 
for moral development, this objection misses the point that there is nothing 
essentially developmental about their moral excellence. The relative generosi-
ty of the philanthropic billionaire might enable his further moral develop-
ment. If he practiced the best balance of other-regarding and self-regarding 
uses of his wealth to which he could constructively aspire, his character 
might improve to the point at which he could constructively aspire to a high-
er standard- perhaps to the degree of self-sacrificial regard for others that 
Mother Teresa exhibited. But that is only one of the ways that his relative 
generosity would be redemptive for him. It increases the degree to which 
his life is conformed to the love of others just by disposing him to serve oth-
ers with his wealth more than he would otherwise be inclined to. Even if he 
would not, by means of such habituation, become able to aspire construc-
tively to a greater degree of self-sacrifice, his relative generosity would still 
be a virtue for him because it would still be well suited to making him good. 
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If he acts in accordance with it, he is doing just what he ought to do morally. 
Given his character, he ought to mix his regard for himself with his regard 
for others in the way that he does because to do so is the best way available 
to him of improving the degree to which he serves others. That makes it 
implausible to deny that this disposition would be a virtue for the billionaire 
because it is not a trait he would have if he fulfilled his telos. Such a denial 
implies that a trait disposing him to do just what he ought to do is not a 
virtue and that doing what he ought to do is not an act of virtue. The objec-
tor could, of course, deny that one is ever obligated to do anything short of 
what one would do if he fulfilled his telos. But it seems wholly implausible 
to deny that one ought to undertake the most morally constructive strategy 
of which one is capable. And I think I have the Christian Scriptures on my 
side in this matter. The New Testament seems, as I have argued, to treat the 
Old Testament Law as both an obligation of Israelites and as falling short of 
what one would do if one loved God and others completely. 
VI. Unfinished Business 
I have been arguing that, since virtue is redemptive, it is relative to the spe-
cific degree and type of corruption from which the character of the relevant 
individuals and communities suffer. Although it seems clear to me that the 
character of the individual and that of the community are both relevant to 
what is redemptive (and therefore virtuous) for the individual and the com-
munity, one job that remains to be done is to specify more clearly how indi-
vidual and community redemptiveness relate to each other in the determi-
nation of character. Such a clarification will be made easier by the fact that 
the love of others is a part of the te/os I have specified. Given that, any dis-
position of an individual that is redemptive for her community, will, all else 
being equal, also be redemptive for that individual, since the life to which it 
disposes him will thereby be better conformed to the love of others. 
While I have said much about redemption as the transformation of our 
character, I have said very little about the transformations of our character 
due to the supernatural intervention of God in which the Christian faith 
gives us reason believe. That is a job for another time. But when a 
Christian understanding of supernatural redemption is integrated with 
what I have been saying, I think it will give Christians, who believe that we 
can benefit more fully from such redemption through faith in Christ, rea-
son to hold ourselves to higher standards of virtue than those to which we 
hold others. I think we will have reason to expect, not only a fuller devel-
opment of the same virtues that we expect to see in others, but also the 
development of virtues that we do not have reason to expect of others. 
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Christian theology are (1) that God's past commands had their redemptive 
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